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DISCOVERING WHO WE ARE: AN
ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE
SIMPSON TRIAL
WILLIAM T. PIZZI*
I start from the premise that no criminal justice system can
be considered strong that is not built on a strong trial system.
This is not to say that all cases have to go to trial; most will not.
But some cases will go to trial, and a society needs to be confident
that its trial system is strong enough to handle those cases. This
is particularly true of cases where the crime charged is serious,
such as murder, aggravated assault, or rape. Some of these cases
may also be high publicity cases, such as the Rodney King beating
case, the O.J. Simpson case, and the Lemrick Nelson case
(accused of the stabbing death of Yankel Rosenbaum), where
large numbers of citizens care about the issues at stake and are
looking at the system with the expectation that it will acquit or
convict with a high degree of reliability. It is dangerous for a
society when citizens lose confidence in its trial system. A
criminal justice system cannot cure deep societal problems, such
as the racial divide that exists in our country, but a criminal
justice system with a weak trial system can exacerbate those
problems. I think we have serious problems with our trial
system, and I fear that the problems will only get worse if we
don't scrutinize the current system and consider major structural
changes.
Professor Allen points out quite eloquently that the American
system is a "grown" system while other systems are "made"
systems. That is certainly true. If you look at European systems,
they are built in detailed codes of criminal procedure that
combine the sorts of things that one would find scattered in a
variety of sources in American jurisdictions: state statutes, rules
of criminal procedure, state evidence rules, federal constitutional
decisions, state constitutional decisions, etc. When European
countries contemplate changes in their systems, they have an
easier time studying and evaluating such changes as parts of the
whole. By contrast, reform in the United States will be far more
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
difficult to achieve. What institution has the responsibility for
seeing how all the pieces of the system fit together and for
suggesting reforms that may impact several discrete bodies of
law? Reform is further complicated by the fact that we have a
federal system.
I strongly agree with Professor Allen's warning that we need
to be careful about the unintended consequences of reform efforts.
But I see the doctrine of unintended consequences as responsible
in large part for the crisis of confidence that the system is facing.
Our system of criminal trials has evolved tremendously over the
last thirty years, and I think some of the changes, even though
they were well-motivated, have indirectly altered the tenor of
trials. Evolution teaches us that not every species evolves for the
best. Some become too specialized for their environment and
their numbers decrease and they may even eventually die off.
Although our trial system is not dead, it is far from healthy.
But where do we go by way of reform? The starting point has
to be an attempt to gain some perspective on our trial system.
The reason I study foreign legal systems was summed up best not
by a lawyer but by a writer, Thomas Mann, in Joseph in Egypt:
"For only by making comparisons can we distinguish ourselves
from others and discover who we are, in order to become all that
we are meant to be."' It is toward that goal of discovering who we
are that I ask you to imagine that the Simpson case had been
tried in England. I offer this comparison not to suggest that the
English trial system is without flaws or that the English system
provides easy answers to our problems, but as a way of suggesting
some general directions for reform that we need to explore.
If the Simpson case were to be tried in England, the first
thing that would be striking to Americans would be the location
of the defendant in the courtroom. The defendant doesn't sit in
the well of the courtroom. He would be seated next to a bailiff in
a small box at the back of the courtroom called "the dock," far
removed from his own attorneys.
At the Simpson trial, the defense lawyers complained about
the difficulties they had "personalizing Mr. Simpson" to the jury.
The problems would be much more difficult in an English
courtroom. There is, I think, a symbolic aspect to the dock. In
1. THOMAS MANN, JOSEPH IN AGYPTEN (1933), quoted and translated in DAVID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, at v (1994).
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England, they seem to have decided that it is the defendant who
is on trial and it is much harder to move the focus of the trial off
that point.
By comparison, we Americans are unsure of the proper focus
of the trial. A dramatic example of this uncertainty in the system
was the Cohn Ferguson case, which took place on the other coast
and at the same time as the Simpson case took place in Los
Angeles. Here was a gunman who had shot and killed six people
on the Long Island Railroad and who had wounded seventeen
others. Mr. Ferguson was permitted to walk around the well of
the courtroom, as if he were a lawyer, cross-examining people
whose lives had been, in some cases, permanently scarred by him.
Was Mr. Ferguson on trial or was he the host of the trial?
Because he has the right to a fair trial, does he somehow own the
trial? And what does it mean for the legal profession that Mr.
Ferguson can conduct his defense from the space where lawyers
work as if he were a lawyer? In England, a defendant may
represent himself but he must do so from the dock at the back of
the courtroom. He wouldn't be allowed into the well of the
courtroom because that area is reserved for members of the legal
profession.
As I watched the Simpson case, I saw a trial that often
seemed to lack focus. At times I could not tell who was on trial.
Was it Dennis Fung, the prosecution, Mark Fuhrman, the Los
Angeles police department, or maybe even society in general?
Maybe what we want in our trial system is to have juries make
judgments about the fairness of society or the wisdom of our laws.
But then we ought to have very different rules of evidence, very
different jury instructions, and very different trials. But I have
one warning: a trial system that is too ambitious and tries to do
many things may not end up not doing anything very well.
One reason that it is harder for the defense to attack the
prosecution in English courtrooms has to do with the structure of
the English adversarial system. The prosecutor, like the defense
attorney, is a barrister hired to present that particular case. The
tradition of switching sides is alive and well in England. Barris-
ters know what it is like to be on the other side of the case, they
have less invested in the matter and, as a result, they are a bit
more courteous to each other and certainly far less strident than
American lawyers. Expressed another way, the level of ideologi-
cal commitment required to be a defense or prosecution barrister
is less than for an American lawyer. To give but one example: in
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Colorado, my students tell me, you will not get hired by our state
public defender system if you put on your resume that you have
worked in a prosecutor's office during law school.
There are other ways the English system controls the level
and kind of adversariness at a criminal trial. In England, you
won't find the prosecution or defense barrister asking a consul-
tant for advice on the appropriate clothing to wear for this kind
of case or this sort of jury. You definitely won't see the prosecu-
tion barrister wearing an angel pin to show affiliation with the
victim as we saw in the Simpson case. Instead, English barris-
ters all dress in equally silly clothing: ridiculous wigs, stiff dickey
collars, and robes. We can laugh about their silly dress but little
things make a difference. The barristers, like the judge who
wears the same attire, stand out in the courtroom as part of the
judicial system. They even sit together at the same bench in the
front of the courtroom. By contrast, what are the limits of
American advocacy? Is there not a difference between represent-
ing a defendant and becoming the alter ego of the defendant? Is
there not a difference between presenting the defendant's side of
the case and trying to manipulate the jury at every turn? When
I read trial magazines and advocacy materials, I am concerned
that we are cheapening ourselves and undermining our trial
system at the same time. I bridle at the gamesmanship and
antics that are being taught and touted as good advocacy.
Perhaps that is the inevitable evolution of adversary systems. If
it is, then the system will die out.
Let me continue with my contrast of the behavior of the
lawyers in the two systems. In England, you won't hear a defense
barrister on the courthouse steps assuring the press that his
client is innocent or a prosecution barrister insisting that the case
against the defendant is overwhelming. Neither barrister can
make any statements to the press. When I heard Johnny
Cochran talking to the press night after night, I had no idea
whether he was speaking personally or as an advocate, and I can't
imagine the public knew either. I think that this contrast
between what is expected professional behavior of advocates in
the two countries raises some serious questions about what it
means to be a lawyer and an advocate in the United States.
Another control on the level of advocacy in English trials
stems from the ethical prohibition that bars a barrister from
rehearsing witnesses or even meeting with witnesses other than
an expert or the client. Because of this ethical restriction, the
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system has to take a somewhat more relaxed view of the rules of
evidence and allow the opposing barrister some flexibility in
examining a witness who has not been through the sort of dress
rehearsal that the American system encourages.
Rehearsing witnesses and putting them through practice
direct and cross-examinations is improper in Europe, as well as
in England. They want witnesses to testify in their own way and
in their own words, free of the influence of lawyers. We are the
exception, and I am afraid that we are continuing to go in that
direction. Some big law firms have mock courtrooms built into
their office space so witnesses can be better prepared, consultants
can give them performance tips, and different trial strategies can
be better tested and evaluated. I think this is a very unhealthy
trend. A trial is, after all, only a trial. It is not a war and ought
not be conceived of that way or carried out that way. Wars are
expensive and they are bitter affairs to be avoided if at all
possible. You cannot fight wars very often. By contrast, England
has trial lawyers who actually go to trial-often-and who make
their living and get paid for being on their feet in the courtroom.
You cannot do that if you have to litigate in the chaos and
confusion that characterized the Simpson case.
Having touched on the First Amendment, I-should mention
how differently the balance is drawn between freedom of the
press and a fair trial in the two countries. In England, the press,
under pain of contempt, is tightly restricted as to what it can
publish prior to or during trial. This has many implications, but
to give one obvious difference that is applicable to a case like the
Simpson case: it means that there is much less need to lock up
jurors. English lawyers tell me the Simpson jury definitely would
not have been sequestered in England prior to the start of
deliberations. I don't know if that is true, but at least the jurors
wouldn't need to sit next to a censor when they watched television
or find their newspaper cut to ribbons before reading it.
I am not a First Amendment expert so I will quickly leave
this area. But before I do, I will just point out that English
lawyers tell me that a defendant would not be permitted to
publish a book during trial and that jurors who talked after the
trial about what went on in the jury room, let alone wrote a book
about it, would be considered in contempt of court.
Let us move on to another major difference between the two
systems: the timing of the defendant's decision to testify. In
England, Mr. Simpson would have had to make up his mind
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whether or not he was going to testify at the very start of the
defense case. It is the practice in England that the defendant
must be the first witness for the defense if he chooses to testify.
The defendant already has had the enormous advantage of
having heard all of the prosecution witnesses. Why should he
have the additional advantage of being able to shape his testi-
mony to that of the defense witnesses as well? But in Brooks v.
Tennessee,2 decided in 1972, the Supreme Court struck down a
Tennessee provision that required the defendant to testify first on
the defense case. The Court ruled that this violated the privilege
against self-incrimination and due process. I know enough about
the history of the privilege against self-incrimination and our
trial system to know that the origins of the privilege had nothing
to do with the timing of the defendant's evidence. And as for due
process, I can't refute the Court's conclusion that a rule that
forces the defendant to decide at the start of the defense case
whether to testify is "fundamentally unfair." But if, as I have
been told by friends on the Internet, the English rule conforms to
the practice in Ireland, in Scotland, in New Zealand, and in all
the states of Australia, I see no reason why the Court should have
condemned the Tennessee rule. This is not a big deal in the vast
majority of trials, but that is precisely the point. Criminal
procedure is a lot harder and more complicated than we may have
thought. The Bill of Rights is not a code of criminal procedure; if
you try to turn it into such a code, your system will be incomplete
and lacking in balance. The result will be a system that is weak
and ineffective.
In suggesting that our system of defendants' rights is
extreme, it may sound like I want to see even more defendants
locked up in a criminal justice system where conviction often
carries with it the risk of a sentence that is harsh and vengeful.
But I suggest that the relationship between punishment and
procedure is a complicated one and that we should not be
surprised to find that a system that is extreme in its procedures
would also be extreme in its punishments.' When a system lacks
confidence in its own procedures, it finds ways to avoid trials. In
2. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
3. I have argued elsewhere that there is a synergy between punishment and
procedure such that extremes in one encourage extremes in the other. See William
T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American Criminal
Justice System, 1996 CONST. COMMENTARY 55, 66-69.
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the United States, the system has evolved so that very few
defendants can risk asserting their constitutional rights.
Mandatory minimums, harsh sentencing guidelines, tough
habitual sentencing provisions, and the like are largely American
phenomena and a natural outgrowth of a system that is too
adversarial, too complicated, and too unreliable to be used
regularly for the determination of guilt or innocence. In short, I
question how well our system actually serves the interests of
defendants.
Judge Ito has been strongly criticized at this Symposium for
his handling of the trial, especially his failure to control the
courtroom and impose limits on the conduct of the lawyers. I
worry that the failure of Judge Ito to control the courtroom is
symptomatic of structural problems in the system. Here I would
suggest two such problems. First, a trial system that tolerates
extremes in advocacy, perhaps even desires such advocacy, and
a trial system that is uncertain about what a trial should be
about is going to make it much harder for judges to control such
trials. Second, as Professor Allen pointed out, the relationship of
trial courts to appellate courts makes trial judges more reluctant
to intervene. I want to concur strongly on that point. One month
into the trial a National Law Journal poll of lawyers showed that
70% believed Simpson would not be convicted and, equally
interesting, 37% said that Ito had already committed reversible
error.4 Both statistics are amazing, but I want to focus on the
latter statistic. This statistic suggests to me that the relationship
between trial courts and appellate courts may have changed in
the last twenty or thirty years so that the authority of trial judges
to control the courtroom has been undercut.
English judges don't have to worry as much about reversal.
It is hard to get a case to an appellate court on other than a
purely legal issue and much, much harder to get a case reversed.
Even where there is a basic error in the jury instruction, for
example, there will be no reversal if the appellate court is
convinced of the defendant's guilt. By contrast, we have built a
system that encourages appeal in the United States-Supreme
Court decisions basically require a defense attorney to file an
appeal after trial in the United States 5-and our appellate courts
4. Andrew Blum, Poll: More Lawyers See O.J. Walking, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27,
1995, at Al.
5. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), requires defense counsel who
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reverse for trial courts' errors that do not call into question the
fairness of the trial. Concrete questions of guilt or innocence, of
substantive fairness, come to be subsumed by an obsession with
procedural correctness.
Let me conclude with a few contrasts having to do with juries.
In England, peremptory challenges are not permitted today and
I have never seen questioning of prospective jurors at any trials
I have observed. The number of peremptories was gradually
decreased in England, going from seven to three and finally to
zero. The judge does have authority in England to accept a
verdict of 10-2 after two hours of deliberations so there is less risk
of the irrational holdout. In contrast to England's gradual
simplification of jury selection, what have we done with jury
selection over the last ten years? We have made it even more
complicated thanks to Batson v. Kentucky6 and its progeny. Even
though we know that our system is already incredibly compli-
cated, somehow we cannot resist adding ever more procedure to
the system.7 I don't know about the wisdom of abolishing
peremptory challenges, but can't we at least minimize the
problems of discrimination that necessitated Batson by cutting
way back on the number of peremptories we permit? In routine
criminal and civil cases in some states, the lawyers are permitted
ten peremptories a side.' I question the way the system is using
scarce resources.
But it would be hard to convince trials lawyers to simplify
jury selection and cut down on peremptories because many of
them think that who you get on the jury is crucial to the outcome.
The Simpson trial exposed many problems with the way evidence
was gathered, preserved, and presented. But even if the police
and the crime scene investigators had done a perfect job, would
it have made any difference to the result? Lots of defense
believe there is no merit to an appeal to file a brief that goes through each possible
issue and explain why each issue lacks merit. The appellate court is then to review
the brief to determine if the appeal lacks merit. Thus, there is appellate review even
of a case that a lawyer believes lacks any merit.
6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See generally William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:
Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97.
7. See William T. Pizzi, Soccer, Football and Trial Systems, 1 COLUM. J. EuR.
LAW 369 (1995) (arguing that the American confidence in elaborate procedures is
partly cultural).
8. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 U.S. 1419 (1994), the Court had before
it a simple paternity case in which each side had ten peremptory challenges.
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lawyers, including Bryan Morgan, who spoke earlier at this
Symposium, think the case was over for the prosecution once the
jury was picked. A trial system is only as strong as its weakest
part, and no matter how well the evidence rules are crafted or
how well the investigatory procedures are designed, if the fact-
finders cannot be trusted, the system will be weak. When jury
consultants tell us that to be understood by jurors, instructions
should be aimed at a sixth grade'level, I have my doubts about
our jury system. There is a lot of romance, rhetoric, and flag
waving that surrounds juries. But at some point, the system
needs to make an honest evaluation of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the jury system. Is there not perhaps some way to
reform the process and keep a substantial citizen involvement in
the criminal justice system, without turning issues at trial over
to a group of fact-finders who have no background in fact-finding
and very minimal training in what it takes? I raise the issue here
to suggest that maybe we have an additional lesson to learn from
England. It is often remarked that "the backbone of the English
system" is its system of lay magistrates. Lay magistrates are
nonlawyers who sit on panels of three and who hear ninety-eight
percent of the criminal cases in that country.
England strikes me as much more realistic about the
weaknesses of juries than we are. In the criminal cases I have
seen, even two- or three-day trials, the judge always summarizes
the evidence and sometimes comments on the evidence. The
summarizing of the evidence by the judge is considered an
integral and important part of the trial. The judges take careful
notes in their own hand throughout the trial in order to be in a
position to do an accurate summary for the jury.
There are obvious tradeoffs in permitting a judge to summa-
rize and comment on the evidence. Obviously, the judge can
influence the jury in the summary, sometimes unfairly. But other
common law systems seem willing to run those risks, believing
that juries need guidance from the judge. American populism, on
the other hand, prohibits judges from commenting on the
evidence or even providing a summary in many states.9 But even
in jurisdictions that allow judges to summarize the evidence, such
9. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall
and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging
Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988).
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as our federal courts, judges are clearly reluctant to use their
power.
Notice the position in which we put jurors compared to the
English system: jurors in the American system are faced with a
trial system that is more ambitious in what it asks of them.
Jurors have to sort out the facts in a trial setting that is often far
more contentious and adversarial than in England, and yet they
get less help from judges in going about the difficult task of
evaluating the evidence.
What I have said in my remarks today should not be taken as
suggesting that the English legal system doesn't have flaws or
that there are not weaknesses in its trial system. England has
had a lot of problems, especially with terrorism cases, which have
their own exceptional and extreme procedures. Some of you may
be familiar with the movie "In the Name of the Father," which
was based loosely on the case known as the "Guildford Four."
And there have been a number of such cases that were later
reversed: the Maguire Seven, the Birmingham Six, and so on.
But I give the English credit. When public confidence was
shaken, they didn't pretend all was well or claim that the
problems were limited to terrorist cases. They formed a Royal
Commission, as they do every fifteen or twenty years. The latest
commission was chaired by a nonlawyer and had a majority of
nonlawyers on it. They studied the system from top to bottom.
They commissioned their own empirical studies and surveys.
They even went up to Scotland and over to France to see if they
should propose radical changes in their system. We desperately
need similar scrutiny of our trial system. We ought not be
frightened by it but ought rather to seek it out and welcome it.
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